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%ULWDLQ¶VDQG6FRWODQG¶Vdisappointing 
productivity performance: causes and potential 
solutions 
 
Jeremy Peat, International Public Policy Institute 
 
 
 
 
I  %ULWDLQ¶VDQG6FRWODQG¶Vproductivity performance 
 
The past was consistent.  For decade after decade, with no more than minor and very short-
term interruptions, productivity ± output per unit of input ± in the UK grew by a steady 1½% to 
2% per annum.  In recessions during the 20th century productivity growth did decelerate, but not 
for long.  The norm was for productivity to accelerate from relatively early in the upswing. 
 
Clearly this mattered, both because increasing productivity was the main factor generating 
growth of GDP and income per head; and because this also was the major contributor to the 
8.¶VFRQWLQXLQJFRPSHWLWLYHQHVVLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOPDUNHWV  Growth of productivity at a rate lower 
than our key trading partners and competitors would mean competitiveness problems and over 
time a decline in growth and a lower exchange rate ± possibly coupled with marginally higher 
interest rates to keep inflation under control. 
 
To explain a little further, in simplified terms, growth in the output of an economy, as measured 
by GDP and other indicators, will be due to some combination of population growth leading to 
a greater supply of labour (more inputs) and increased productivity.  A greater supply of labour 
may increase output, but not necessarily output per head or indeed income per head and 
economic welfare.  Increased productivity should lead to both higher output1 and higher output 
per head, both directly and via enhanced competitiveness.  Increasing productivity, especially 
relative to key competitors, is both a recipe for and a symbol of economic success and potential 
for greater affluence.  It matters for the economy as a whole but also for households and 
enterprises. 
 
This stable and predictable state of affairs regarding productivity growth came to an end at the 
time of the 2008 banking sector-induced recession ± or possibly somewhat earlier.  Since then 
                                                          
1
 The increase in output is not necessarily in terms of quantity. Increased output via improved productivity can be via 
quality changes resulting in an output of higher unit value. Likewise investment to achieve increased productivity can 
be in skills, etc. as well as in physical equipment. 
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UK productivity growth, and SUREDEO\WRDVOLJKWO\OHVVHUH[WHQW6FRWODQG¶Vhas stagnated ± and 
deteriorated as compared to most other major economies.2 
 
Most forecasting models still include something aNLQ WR D µUHYHUVLRQ WR WKH QRUP¶ VR IDU DV
productivity is concerned.  They assume that the rate of productivity growth will return to the 
long-term trend.  The only question, as so often in economic forecasts, appears to be on the 
timing of a move; when the reversion will take place.  Even in their latest Inflation Reports the 
Bank of England economists justify their forecast of a pick-up in growth into 2016 and beyond 
on the basis of productivity growth reverting to the norm. 
 
Unfortunately nobody has produced a convincing analysis as to why productivity growth has 
stayed so low for so long; and failing such analysis it is remarkably difficult to explain 
convincingly why and when any reversion should happen.  That is not to say that a reversion 
will not happen, rather that we cannot readily explain why this should be the case if we do not 
know how to explain the productivity story over the past 8 years or so.  Indeed if we do not 
better understand what has been going on over this period and if a µUHYHUVLRQWRWKHQRUP¶GRHV
transpire, then we will not know why, will not be able to understand its implications and will not 
know how best to ensure that higher productivity growth is continued.  And if it does not transpire 
then we will have no idea as to what policies should be prioritised to achieve what ends. 
 
 
II  Possible Causes 
 
,I\RXJRRJOH8.SURGXFWLYLW\WKHVHGD\V\RXZLOOILQGQXPHURXVUHIHUHQFHVWRWKHµFRQXQGUXP¶
RUµSX]]OH¶RIZK\SURGXFWLYLW\JURZWKGLG not recover as the UK emerged from recession ± albeit 
into a slow and limited recovery.  A wide variety of theories have been posited with some more 
convincing than others.  The remainder of this IPPI Policy Brief considers and assesses some 
of the theories, before I set out my own analysis. 
 
1. Is it just a blip? 
This argument is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain.  The µblip¶ has been long lasting.  
This is not just one of those anomalies that we can ignore and pass by on the other side ± 
especially as the downturn (or at least growth below long term trend) is still with us. 
 
2. The problem is the data 
There are some grounds for believing that adjustments to key data sets have, at the least, made 
calculations between past and present productivity more complex.  More generally economic 
                                                          
2
 For more very helpful detail on and analysis of 6FRWODQG¶VSURGXFWLYLW\SHUIRUPDQFHSOHDVHVHHµ6FRWODQG¶V
3URGXFWLYLW\3HUIRUPDQFH/DWHVWGDWDDQGLQVLJKWV¶E\.HQQ\5LFKPRQGDQG-HQQLIHU7XUQEXOORI6FRWWLVK(QWHUSULVH
as published in the Fraser of Allander Institute Commentary Volume 39 Number 2; November 2015.  
University of Strathclyde | International Public Policy Institute                                                                        Policy Brief 
November 2015                                                                                                                                                              3 
data are always subject to change.  Many economists over the years have written doctoral 
theses on how key economic data have changed and how such changes have resulted in 
substantially different interpretation of events ± and consequently the scope for sub-optimal 
policies based on what has later turned out to be an incorrect view of (at that time) very recent 
economic history. 
 
3. All explained by structural change? 
At its simplest the argument here is that a high share of productivity growth comes from 
manufacturing.  The re-structuring and down-sizing of manufacturing alongside the continuing 
increase in the share of services in the UK HFRQRP\KDVOLPLWHGWKHVFRSHIRUµROGIDVKLRQHG¶
productivity growth.  This is less the case in Germany, for example, which has maintained a 
much higher share of manufacturing in its economy and managed significantly higher 
productivity growth post-recession.  In some ways this argument links to the data point above.  
Productivity change in manufacturing is much easier to measure than in the service sector.  The 
data sets which we have do not readily pick out the changes in many elements of the service 
sector, including especially changes in quality, which equate to productivity growth3.  In principle 
productivity growth should be a key aspiration for services as much as for manufacturing. 
 
4. Not just a UK phenomenon? 
It is correct that productivity trends globally do vary markedly.  However, the UK ± and 
6FRWODQG¶V± weak performance does stand out as compared to our peer group, including our 
key competitors.  Even if the problem is to some extent shared with some other countries that 
does not mean that we do not need to better understand its causation. 
 
5. Down to availability of cheap labour? 
This line of argument appears to have significant merits ± as a partial explanation.  In recent 
years we have seen a very welcome rise in employment, resulting in much lower levels of 
unemployment through and post-recession than was anticipated.  Concurrently, for several 
years, average earnings declined in real terms.  A combination of an unexpected degree of 
increase in the domestic labour supply (more people entering the labour force and people 
working more hours) and the increased level of UK in-migration did result in a ready availability 
of low cost, albeit to some extent relatively low skilled, labour.  Companies seeking to expand 
output in uncertain times may have preferred to add to their pool of labour rather than taking 
steps to invest in new equipment.  In the UK labour can be relatively easily hired and fired (at 
least at the margin)4 while much investment in equipment is both lumpy and of significant scale 
± and has only a limited resale value.  However, given constraints on the labour supply in the 
                                                          
3
 See footnote 2 above. 
4
 Not to mention zero hours contracts giving employers great flexibility within their existing labour force. 
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short to medium term, this may now mean that production via extra labour may no longer be 
such a cheap option ± as WKHµVXUSOXV¶of labour is largely utilised. 5 
 
6. Risk aversion is rife ± and justifiable? 
This theory works alongside the availability of cheap labour.  Perceived risks in the business 
environment, domestically and internationally, were very high during and post-recession.  The 
Great Recession was a trauma the like of which had not been experienced before.  Nobody 
was at all sure as to how the domestic and global economies would subsequently evolve.  
(Indeed we are still unsure ± in many ways we have yet to revert to the economic norm.)  This 
was/still is a time to be risk averse, waiting for more certainty to appear on the horizon before 
making significant investments.  Survival was/is the watchword. 
 
7. The wrong type of management? 
Likewise it was a time when a sound financial manager at the helm was deemed safer than an 
entrepreneurial type.  Senior recruitment executives have pointed out that a high percentage of 
top tier CEO jobs in Scotland in recent years have been filled by someone from the finance area 
± often the incumbent finance director.  A safe pair of hands was preferred just to keep the show 
on the road, with the more entrepreneurial type of manager kept on ice until risks had receded.  
Innovation was not on the business agenda and remains a relatively low priority. 
 
8. Shortages of risk capital ± blame the banks (again)? 
This view again reinforces the previous three arguments.  Just as many companies will have 
been risk averse, so too the banks.  Indeed given their experiences through the past decade 
they would not only be likely to be risk averse but for many years will have been capital 
constrained.  However, the limited level of investment in the UK economy, the other side of the 
coin to strong growth of employment, has been due to both limited demand for funds for 
investment from corporate UK and (probably to a lesser extent) constraints on the supply of 
funds.  Any constraint on the availability of capital, alongside an unwillingness to invest has 
simply overwhelmed the positive effect of ultra-low interest rates. 
 
 
III  But productivity really matters 
 
Should we simply rely upon faith that a norm reversion to the previous trend in productivity 
growth will just come along soon?  Or should we not try to understand what has been going on 
and then consider what could and should be our response?! 
                                                          
5
 One item of good news is that this may be leading to more emphasis on improving the quality of existing labour 
forces, i.e. via training, etc. 
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The importance of achieving renewed productivity growth was underlined a few months back 
(22nd June 2015) in a speech by the Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, Jon Cunliffe who 
noted that: - 
 
³,QWKH\HDUVSULRUWRWKHFULVLV>WKHUHFHVVLRQ@JURZWKLQWKHKRXUVZRUNHG
in the UK economy accounted for 23% of overall economic growth.  The mainstay 
of economic growth, the other 77%, came from growth in productivity.  Since 2013, 
only 9% of UK economic growth has come from productivity improvement.  The 
UHPDLQLQJKDVFRPHIURPWKHLQFUHDVHLQWKHWRWDOKRXUVZRUNHG´ 
 
He went RQWRQRWHWKDWDJUDGXDOSLFNXSLQSURGXFWLYLW\LVFHQWUDOWRWKH03&¶V then current 
forecast.  +RZHYHU ³it may never be possible to explain fully what has happened to UK 
productivity since the crisis ± WKH³SURGXFWLYLW\SX]]OH´´ 
 
As noted above, in my view it is important to attempt to develop a reasoned hypothesis as to 
the cause of slow productivity growth; and from this base to consider how the tide might be 
turned; and thence to address possible policy solutions. 
 
 
IV  A reasonable hypothesis 
 
Slow productivity growth in the UK and Scotland in recent years can plausibly be ascribed to a 
combination of factors 5 to 8 listed above (i.e. cheap labour, risk aversion, cautious 
management and risk capital constraints).  The starting point would have been risk aversion in 
the corporate sector.  Interest rates may have been as low as was feasible, but the priority was 
to survive not borrow or invest.  The proportion of loss-making firms in our economy remains 
way above the long-run average.  Nevertheless liquidations have not shot up.  Companies are 
hanging on ± ZHKDYHZKDW&XQOLIIHKDVGHVFULEHGDVµPRUHWKDQDKLQWRIµ]RPELQHVV¶LQWKH
corporate sector¶. 
 
In these circumstances the finance director holds sway and caution and short-termism are the 
watchwords.  Fortunately, as capacity became constrained and there was a desire to increase 
production, then a low risk option was at hand.  Low cost labour was readily available and 
flexible ± via short-term contracts, part-time employment and zero hour contracts, etc.  This 
flexible and low cost labour could be deployed as that short-term option while the balance sheet 
was being gradually moved out of intensive care.  This will have suited the troubled relationship 
and risk managers at the banks as well as directors, institutional investors and shareholders. 
 
This hypothesis is consistent with developments in the UK economy; namely low investment, 
higher than projected employment ± but with an emphasis on short-term and part-time, certainly 
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flexible arrangements ± and (until recently) declining real wages.  At the same time international 
competitiveness appears to have suffered and the UK trade deficit has grown and grown.  A 
higher than normal share of growth of GDP has come from consumption6, on the back of high 
employment, declining consumer prices and cheap and readily-accessible credit, and all this 
despite declining real wages. 
 
 
V  How to turn the tide? 
 
The view from the Bank of England appears to be that factors are already at play which will lead 
to trend reversal; and a return to productivity growth as usual.  Again to quote Cunliffe: - ³As the 
economy grows, spare capacity is used up.  The real cost of labour increases relative to the 
cost of investment.  Firms have a greater incentive to find efficiency gains and to switch away 
from more labour-intensive forms of production.  TKLVVKRXOGERRVWSURGXFWLYLW\´ 
 
Certainly there is some logic to this theory and also evidence that real wages are rising once 
more.  ,QGHHGWKHODWHVWTXDUWHU¶VSURGXFWLYLW\GDWDDUHPLOGO\HQFRXUDJLQJ  However, the trends 
in business investment remain deeply disappointing.  Similarly there is little evidence of any 
marked increase in bank lending or indeed demand for credit from the corporate sector.  The 
incentives may have switched somewhat ± from labour to capital ± but risk aversion remains 
and innovation is scarce.7 
 
The domestic and external environments will be key factors in the risk equation.  The eurozone 
is the key market for many UK and Scottish companies.  The continuing problems with Greece, 
and the perceived risks across the eurozone flowing from the Greek crisis8, are constant 
headlines in the media.  More attention is now being paid to deceleration in the Chinese 
economy and greater risks elsewhere amongst the BRIC nations ± Brazil and Russia to be 
precise.  The decline in commodity prices and the lower level of oil prices are all indicative of 
more global economic uncertainty.  The expectation of the FAI, Bank of England and others is 
that global growth will gently slow, with the majority of growth coming from the emerging 
markets, although growth there is also expected to decelerate.  Within this context the 
continuing strength of sterling, against the euro in particular, is having an adverse effect on 
exports. 
 
                                                          
6
 And in Scotland from publicly funded construction. 
7
 In their November Inflation Report the Bank of England states that: - ³The MPC judges that productivity growth is 
likely to slow a little in the near term before picking up modestly over the next few years, as the factors weighing on it 
ZDQHIXUWKHU$OWKRXJKWKHUHLVVXEVWDQWLDOXQFHUWDLQW\DURXQGWKLVMXGJHPHQW´>,QRWKHUZRUGVLWLVVWLOOXQFOHDUZKDWZLOO
happen and when.] 
8
 $QGQRZXQFHUWDLQWLHVUHJDUGLQJ8.¶VSODFHLQ(XURSHFRXSOHGZLWKFRQFHUQVDERXWLPPLJUDQWIORZV 
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My view is that there should be a gentle pick up in investment, innovation, productivity and 
hence competitiveness; but that this will be markedly slower and is far less secure in probability 
terms than assumed in many macro models.  This in turn will imply slower growth of GDP than 
estimated.  Hence we should consider carefully how a pick-up in innovation and investment 
more generally can be encouraged WRERRVWWKH8.DQG6FRWODQG¶VSURGXFWLYLW\SHUIRUPDQFH.   
 
If we achieve a return to growth in average earnings at historic rates without an increase in 
productivity then the result will be higher inflation and, consequently, higher interest rates and 
a lower growth of GDP and economic welfare. 
 
 
VI  Policy options: Dµ3URGXFWLYLW\&RPPLVVLRQ¶IRU6FRWODQG" 
 
There is no µproductivity plan¶ in place in Scotland, or indeed at the UK level9.  The Chancellor 
has suggested that improved housing options would assist ± to allow greater flexibility and 
mobility of labour.  +HKDVDOVRSRLQWHGWRLPSURYHGLQIUDVWUXFWXUHSDUWLFXODUO\IRUWKHµ1RUWKHUQ
3RZHUKRXVH¶DVDQHQFRXUDJHPHQW WRFRUSRUDWHH[SDQVLRQ± including movement into new 
markets ± and investment.  These policies are of themselves perfectly sensible but cannot be 
seen as tackling the root causes of WKH8.¶Vlow productivity growth. 
 
Clearly the answer must lie in enhanced innovation, increased investment, better utilisation of 
(and of course availability of) key skills, better understanding of markets (domestic and 
especially international), sensible risk-taking by informed and dynamic management and a 
continuing focus upon higher value-added and enhanced quality to increase competitiveness.  
How these outcomes can be achieved, what might be appropriate interventions to best help 
incentivise such favourable outcomes is a moot point. 
 
One final thought; could a short term µ3URGXFWLYLW\&RPPLVVLRQ¶IRU6FRWODQGhelp to set out 
a way forward for businesses, Government and other interested parties WRLPSURYH6FRWODQG¶V
productivity performance and thereby increase the opportunity to increase economic welfare in 
Scotland? 
 
                                                          
9
 $OWKRXJKWKH8.*RYHUQPHQWGLGSXEOLVKLQ-XO\³Fixing the foundations: &UHDWLQJDPRUHSURVSHURXVQDWLRQ´
Cm 9098 
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